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In this study, we investigate the role of informal institutions (religiosity and culture) in determining managers’ choices of 
earnings management methods (accruals vs. real activities), after controlling for formal institutions (investor protection, 
enforcement quality and equity market development). Using an ethical perspective, we find that managers tend to choose an 
earnings management strategy that meets the prevailing social (informal) norms of the environment where the firm is 
headquartered. Specifically, our analysis shows that firms domiciled in countries with strong religious adherence and high-
power-distance cultures prefer to manage their earnings ‘upwards’ through real activities rather than accruals. Overall, our 
results suggest that informal institutions determine managers’ earnings management choices at least as strongly as formal 
institutions do. It would therefore be misleading to analyze managers’ choices in managing earnings solely from the formal 




























1. Introduction  
In this paper, we examine the impact of informal institutions on managers’ earnings management choices after controlling 
for the impact of formal institutions across IFRS-adopting nations. Prior political science literature suggests that applying the 
same formal rules in different societies may not necessarily lead to similar outcomes due to the impact of informal rules (North, 
1990). Consistent with this view, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue that when informal institutions are circumvented or 
ignored, formal constraints become ineffective and only exist on paper. Therefore, an analysis of institutional factors that 
ignores or downplays informal institutions tends to be incomplete and needs to be refined to include informal institutions 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). This indicates that informal institutions are as important as formal institutions, because informal 
institutions cannot be changed by the stroke of a pen and “are not typically amenable to deliberate human manipulation” 
(North, 2005, p. 50). Applying this logic to international accounting, informal institutions’ effects on accounting practices 
across countries cannot be isolated from the effects of formal institutions. 
Existing work in the international accounting literature, however, has not applied a systematic method – either empirically 
or conceptually – to identify the salient institutional factors contributing to cross-country differences in accounting practices; 
rather, they have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis (Schweikart, 1985; Perera and Baydoun, 2007). Nobes (1998) reviewed 
the literature and confirmed that multiple theoretical models have been proposed in order to identify and classify the factors 
determining accounting differences at the international level. As Nobes explicates, many of these factors are interrelated, and, 
in most studies, only a few are included at a time, in part due to the lack of a theoretical measurement model and in part due 
to the empirical problem associated with multicollinearity (see, for example, Houqe et al., 2012).  
Due to (i) the lack of agreement among accounting scholars on the most important factors that influence accounting 
practices at the international level; (ii) the lack of ‘standardized’ conceptual definitions of institutions; and (iii) the lack of a 
theoretical measurement model for these institutions, we establish measurement instruments that capture differences between 
countries in relation to their formal institutional settings, namely: Investor Protection, Enforcement Quality and Equity Market 
Development, and then empirically assess their reliability and validity. After controlling for the impact of these formal 
institutions, we investigate the impact of informal institutions (culture and religiosity) on accruals and real earnings 
management using a large sample of firms drawn from 22 IFRS-adopting countries2. The need to consider both accruals-based 
and real earnings management is motivated by the findings of Graham et al. (2005), who demonstrated that firms employ both 
techniques in managing earnings, with a preference for real earnings management after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOA). Zang (2012) observed a possible substitution effect between the two methods. The trade-off between the two methods 
can be explained by two possible hypotheses: the litigation hypothesis and the ethical perspective hypothesis.  
Under the litigation hypothesis, managers would prefer real earnings management over accruals-based earnings 
management. This is because (i) real earnings management is more difficult for shareholders to detect and makes it more 
difficult for them to litigate and sue managers (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008); and (ii) managers are less scrutinized 
by auditors and regulators when using real earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), as such methods do not fall 
within the scope of an audit. The litigation perspective offers a partial explanation of why managers choose a particular 
earnings management method (i.e. accruals vs. real); the ethical perspective, however, provides a complementary perspective 
that explains managers’ choices of earnings management methods. Employing Kohlberg’s (1969) theory of cognitive moral 
development (CMD), Rutledge and Karim (1999) find that managers’ economic behaviors are driven not only by their self-
interest but also by ethical/moral considerations. Consistent with this line of reasoning, religious norms and cultural values are 
likely to play an important role in determining managers’ economic decisions by creating a moral climate, as suggested by 
Welch et al. (1991), which exerts a moral deterrent effect on deviant behaviors (e.g. cheating on one’s tax returns). In the 
 
2 To minimize any confounding effects that could occur as a result of applying different accounting standards, we restrict our sample to 
countries in which IFRS adoption has been made mandatory. 
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context of earnings management, managers perceive real earnings management as more ethical than accruals earnings 
management (Bruns and Merchant, 1990), and therefore they switch to real earnings management when they are socially or 
ethically pressured.  
Our results show that the significance and the sign of some institutions change when both formal and informal institutions 
are included in the same regression model compared to the results when regressed separately. This indicates the limitations of 
using only one type of institution in the analysis. We find that accruals earnings management is lower but real earnings 
management is higher in countries with higher power distance and religiosity. Extant evidence provides explanations regarding 
why we observe this. Waldman et al. (2006) argue that in large-power-distance countries, there is social pressure on managers 
to be less opportunistic, thereby reducing the likelihood of them engaging in unethical earnings management practices. Walker 
et al. (2012) find that the managers of firms headquartered in more-religious communities tend not to engage in ethically 
questionable practices, to avoid possible social sanctions. Interestingly, among the informal institutions, we find that 
Religiosity is the most economically important factor influencing earnings management across countries. The additional 
analysis on the direction of earnings management also reveals interesting insights. We find that lower accruals-based earnings 
management, which is associated with higher religiosity and higher power distance, tends not to be only less income increasing 
but also more income decreasing, suggesting that social pressures may suppress income-increasing behavior via accruals.  
Our study extends existing cross-country accounting research (e.g. Ahmed et al., 2013;Bonetti et al., 2016; Doukakis, 
2014; Enomoto et al., 2015; Houqe et al., 2012; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017) by investigating the relationship between informal 
institutions (religiosity and culture) and both accruals and real earnings management after controlling for the effect of formal 
institutions. More precisely, our study extends the works of Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2015), who 
have examined the impact of culture/religion on earnings management using a sample of banks only, by employing a sample 
of non-financial firms drawn from 22 IFRS-adopting countries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. The following section, Section 2, presents the literature review 
and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the data and research design, followed by Section 4, which provides the 
findings and discussion. The conclusions and limitations of this study are presented in Section 5.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Much of the literature concerning the association between institutions and earnings management in the context of 
mandatory IFRS adoption focuses on the effect of IFRS adoption on accruals earnings management (e.g. Houqe et al., 2012) 
or on both accruals and real earnings management (e.g. Doukakis, 2014; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017). These studies fail, 
however, to consider the impact of countries’ informal institutions and thus at best offer only a partial explanation of cross-
country variations in earnings management within the context of mandatory IFRS adoption. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) 
suggest that without ‘simultaneous’ consideration of formal and informal institutions, any institutional analysis is incomplete. 
This is because while formal institutions are more visible and explicit (and are often written), informal institutions (which are 
often unwritten) also play an important role in constraining and enabling behavior. Informal institutions should not, therefore, 
be overlooked in any future research. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (p. 727). Examples of 
informal institutions include traditions, customs, religion and moral values. 
While Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) use a sample of banks to investigate culture/religion 
and earnings management, our study employs a sample of non-financial companies in 22 IFRS-adopting countries. More 
specifically, we examine the association between the countries’ informal institutions and earnings management after 
controlling for the impact of formal institutions. Our study also builds a theoretical link between informal institutions (culture 
and religion) and earnings management. The task of outlining a theoretically plausible relationship between earnings 
management and cultural dimensions is difficult for at least two reasons: (i) the existence of two opposing viewpoints (both 
have theory and evidence in their favor) concerning the impact that culture may have on earnings management (see, for 
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example, Doupnik, 2008; Zhang et al., 2013); and (ii) the difficulty in isolating the effects of culture from other institutions 
(Han et al., 2010). The difficulty is made more acute by the (unobserved) heterogeneity across countries and the small number 
of observations available for each country.  
Culture refers to the social norms and values in a group or society that people belong to. According to Hofstede et al. 
(2010), culture is “ the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people 
from others”(p. 6). A number of studies have examined the relationship between culture and earnings management and have 
found evidence of an association between cultural dimensions and earnings management (Desender et al., 2011; Doupnik, 
2008; Guan et al., 2005; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007; Zhang et al., 2013). However, their findings must be interpreted 
with caution because the effect of culture on earnings management is conditional on the level of regulation and monitoring in 
a country (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011). Culture may therefore not be as important in influencing earnings management practices 
on its own, without considering the impacts of other institutional factors. For instance, Waldman et al. (2006) argue that in 
situations of low power distance, institutional pressures may push managers to be good stewards of the firm. This is consistent 
with Stulz and Williamson’s (2003) argument that when investigating the differences in the degree of investor protection 
across countries, the effect of culture cannot be ignored, especially because its impact cannot be isolated from other institutions 
(Han et al., 2010). The cultural elements of interest for the analysis in this study are individualism and power distance because 
of their close association with ethical decision-making in business (Goodwin et al., 2000; Smith and Hume, 2005; Waldman 
et al., 2006). 
Prior research suggests that there is a link between culture (including religion) and ethical beliefs (e.g. Vitell et al., 1993; 
Smith and Hume, 2005). For the purpose of this study, we use the ethical perspective to better understand why managers 
engage more or less in earnings management activities given the fact that ethical considerations may constrain their economic 
behavior, as CMD theory suggests (Rutledge and Karim, 1999). It is worth noting here that managers consider managing 
earnings via operational actions as more ethical than employing accounting procedures (Bruns and Merchant, 1990). In support 
of this view, Parfet (2000) refers to “operational earnings management” as “good earnings management”. He adds: “achieving 
stable and predictable results and positive earnings trends through good planning and operational responsiveness is not illegal 
or unethical. It is a mark of skill and excellence that the market seeks and rewards” (p. 485).  
Using the ethical perspective, it would be useful to examine the effects of unwritten rules, religion and culture on earnings 
management after controlling for formal institutions to develop a better understanding of managers’ choices of earnings 
management across countries adopting IFRS.  
2.1. Religiosity  
There have been many studies (e.g. Barnett et al., 1996; Iannaccone, 1998; Lehrer, 2004; Parboteeah et al., 2008; 
Sunstein, 1996; Terpstra et al., 1993; Walker et al., 2012; Weaver and Agle, 2002; Zahn, 1970) on the impact of religion on a 
society’s norms and values, as well as its impact on the economic behavior of the members of a society. The influence of 
religion has also been examined in the financial accounting literature (e.g. Conroy and Emerson, 2004; McGuire et al., 2012). 
In spite of a number of studies (e.g. Longenecker et al., 2004) documenting the relationship between religiosity and lower 
acceptance of ‘unethical’ accounting and auditing practices, only recently has the academic literature begun to explore the 
association between contextual religiosity and earnings management in a cross-country setting (e.g. Kanagaretnam et al., 
2015).  
Religious beliefs are an important source shaping a person’s moral or ethical behavior (Vitell et al., 1993). Drawing on 
social norm theories, managers’ decision-making processes – regardless of their affinity to religion – are influenced by the 
religious social norms of the community where those managers live and operate (Sunstein, 1996; Cialdini and Goldstein, 
2004). It is suggested that deviations from the mainstream religion’s norms or the defiance of God’s laws and commandments 
generate high levels of irritability or psychological discomfort, which in turn motivates adherents to change their behavior or 
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to conform to religious role expectations (Sunstein, 1996; Weaver and Agle, 2002). Therefore, all else being equal, the more 
salient the religious norms in a society, the more likely a person’s behavior is to be guided by the religious expectations 
associated with the roles they are destined to play in society (Kennedy and Lawton, 1998; Walker et al., 2012). 
This argument is in line with the ‘moral communities’ hypothesis, which proposes that higher levels of religiosity in a 
community (i.e. moral communities) are more influential in promoting conformity to the community’s moral order (Stark et 
al., 1980; 1982) by means of creating a moral climate that exerts a moral deterrent effect on individual deviance (Welch et al., 
1991). In this regard, Welch et al. (1991) examine the role of the intensity of community religiosity in inhibiting deviant 
behaviors (cheating on one’s tax returns, excessive drinking and unauthorized use of an employer’s equipment for personal 
gain) and find evidence in support of the deviance-inhibiting effect of community-level religiosity. Stavrova et al. (2013) 
suggest that religiosity is a ‘social’ control mechanism through which societal members, on the one hand, reward those who 
are conforming to the norms of the religious denomination to which they belong through social recognition and respect, and, 
on the other hand, sanction those who are violating these norms through open criticism and the withdrawal of social support 
(Hechter and Opp, 2001; Horne, 2009).  
Applying this intuition to the practice of earnings management, managers of firms headquartered in religious 
communities tend not to engage in ethically questionable scenarios (Walker et al., 2012), such as accruals manipulation, in an 
attempt to avoid any social sanctions associated with non-adherence to the religious norms in that society. This is particularly 
the case because a risk-averse attitude is more pervasive in areas with higher religious adherence (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; 
Diaz, 2000), wherein firm managers are less subject to class-action lawsuits (McGuire et al., 2012).  
A number of studies have examined the association between religious adherence and engagement with earnings 
management activities. One of the earliest studies to investigate the influence of religiosity on managers’ methods of managing 
earnings was completed by McGuire et al. (2012). The authors provide empirical evidence suggesting that firms headquartered 
in areas with strong religious social norms have low incidences of financial reporting irregularities. They also find evidence 
that while accruals manipulation is less prevalent, real earnings management is more prevalent among firms located in more-
religious areas. Based on this evidence, the authors conclude that in attempting to meet earnings targets, the managers of firms 
in areas of high religious adherence have a greater propensity to manage reported earnings (upward) through real activities 
than accruals manipulation, especially because the former is viewed as more ethical (Bruns and Merchant, 1990) and cannot 
be second-guessed by external auditors, therefore being less risky (Graham et al., 2005). 
Similarly, Dyreng et al. (2012) investigate the impact of the level of religious adherence on managerial accrual choices 
and find evidence in support of the dominant role of the religious norm of honesty, rather than the norm of risk aversion, in 
curbing the intentional misreporting or misrepresentation of accounting information (as proxied by financial statement 
restatement). Specifically, they find that in attempting to avoid financial restatements stemming from overstated 
assets/revenues or understated liabilities/expenses, the managers of firms headquartered in areas with high religious adherence 
are less likely to bias their accrual estimates upward (i.e. an income-decreasing bias is more prevalent than an income-
increasing bias) and instead report accruals that are more reflective of the firm’s economic fundamentals (i.e. smaller 
deviations from expected accruals and better mapping into cash flows over time). Using an international sample of banks, 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) investigate the impact of religious level in the country surrounding a bank’s headquarters on 
earnings management and find that banks in countries with higher religiosity scores have lower levels of income-increasing 
earnings management behavior. 
On the basis of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence laid out in this section, the following two hypotheses 
are proposed: 
H1a: Accruals earnings management is less pronounced in countries with high levels of religiosity.  
H1b: Real earnings management is greater in countries with high levels of religiosity. 
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2.2. Power distance  
High power distance refers to societies wherein subordinate members accept the unequal distribution of power or 
authority (Hofstede, 1984), which is centralized or concentrated in the hands of superior members, who can make decisions 
autocratically (Clugston et al., 2000). In societies with high power distance, subordinates are assumed to obey without 
questioning their superiors (Javidan et al., 2006) and in return expect their interests to be protected by their superiors (Vitell 
et al., 1993). 
According to Hofstede et al. (2010), “In large-power-distance countries, accounting systems will be frequently used to 
justify the decisions of the top power holder(s): they are seen as the power holder’s tool to present the desired image, and 
figures will be twisted to this end” (p. 319). This could be true not only because managers in high-power-distance countries 
are more concerned with their own interests than with the interests of stakeholders (Waldman et al., 2006) but also because 
subordinates are assumed to be more obedient to their superiors, and therefore less likely to resist managers’ engagement in 
questionable or unethical accounting techniques (Trevino, 1986; Tian and Peterson, 2016). This should, in turn, result in 
managers having a greater ability to “more easily influence financial reporting choices for opportunistic reasons” 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2011, p. 856). In view of this argument, one would therefore expect managers from high-power-distance 
orientations to be more inclined to manage or manipulate accounting numbers in an attempt to maximize their own utility 
(implying a positive correlation between earnings management and power distance). 
The above argument, however, does not consider that higher power distance gives rise to an obligation towards society, 
which in turn puts pressure on managers in such societies to be good agents of their firms and to look out for the interests of 
the business owners and other stakeholders when making decisions (Waldman et al., 2006). It has also been suggested that in 
large-power-distance countries, there is greater emphasis on superiors, and more-formal norms are put in place to protect 
subordinates/outsiders from abuse by their superiors/insiders, who are able to make decisions unilaterally without consulting 
their subordinates (Vitell et al., 1993). Therefore, all else being equal, managers in countries with large power distance will be 
“less likely to engage in the practice of earnings management that would present an unrealistic portrayal of the company in an 
attempt to seem better than others” (Geiger et al., 2006, p. 182). In light of all the above discussions, it thus seems reasonable 
to expect that in countries where cultural value norms are more prominent, managers will feel an obligation to choose 
accounting techniques that are ethically acceptable or legitimate (e.g. real earnings management).  
Given the solid support for both sides of the issue, we refrain from making a prediction about the direction of the 
relationship between power distance and earnings management. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H2: There is an association between the level of power distance in a country and earnings management. 
2.3. Individualism  
Under individualism, societal members are mainly concerned with their own interests and the interests of their immediate 
families; in contrast, under collectivism, societal members belong to one or more groups (e.g. extended families or clans) from 
which they cannot detach themselves (Hofstede, 1984). 
In individualistic societies, managers tend to pursue their own self-interests, even at the expense of the needs of other 
stakeholders (Han et al., 2010), and therefore are likely to manage earnings to either meet or beat benchmarks. As 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) suggest, in highly individualistic societies where concern for other stakeholders’ welfare is low, 
managers tend to engage more in risk-taking activities in an attempt to maximize their own utility. In contrast, in societies 
scoring low on individualism, members (including shareholders, as well as other stakeholders) expect their managers to look 
after them from cradle to grave, much like an extended family, and to protect their interests (Hofstede, 1980). That is, in 
collectivistic societies, the interests of other stakeholder groups are of inherent concern in managerial decision-making – 
managers feel responsible towards stakeholders. According to Waldman et al. (2006), managers in cultures characterized by 
higher collectivistic values “have duties and obligations to the greater collective that outweigh personal concerns” (p. 826). In 
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view of this argument, one would therefore expect that in the pursuit of their self-interest, managers in individualistic countries 
are more likely to engage in earnings management activities. 
Despite the wealth of empirical evidence supporting the above argument, there is also theoretical reason, as well as 
empirical evidence, opposing this argument. By adhering to legal rules, the members of a society feel that their interests are 
protected. Managers in individualistic societies are, however, more likely to comply with the legal rules and laws than their 
counterparts in collectivistic societies are, wherein their interests are “protected by extended families with which they exchange 
loyalty” (Zhang et al., 2013, p. 657). In contrast, managers in collectivistic societies are likely to follow the rules and norms 
shared within the group they belong to, rather than following social norms, such as honesty, integrity and law obedience 
(Zhang et al., 2013). In support of this argument, Smith and Hume (2005) provide evidence suggesting that accountants from 
collectivistic countries are more likely to engage in ‘questionable’ behavior. Following the logic of this argument, one would 
expect that managers in collectivistic countries are less obedient to the legal norms and therefore more likely to engage in 
(unethical) earnings management activities.  
Based on the opposing viewpoints and conflicting evidence with regard to the role of individualism in earnings 
management practices, this study investigates the association between accruals/real earnings management and individualism 
but makes no explicit prediction about the direction of the relationship. In light of the above discussions, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
H3: There is an association between the degree of individualism in a country and earnings management. 
3. Data and research design  
3.1. Models  
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regressions focusing on informal institutions, namely religiosity, power 
distance and individualism:3 
!"##$,& = () + (+,-.$/$01$&2 +	(4506-7	!$1&89:-	 + (;<9=$>$=?8.$1@	 + (A	<9>-1&07	570&-:&$09 + (B	C9D07:-@-9&	E?8.$&2
+	(F	G87H-&	!->-.0I@-9&	 + 	(JK$7@	L->-.	M878$N.-1$,& + D$O-=	-DD-:&1 + P$,&											(+)					 
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3.1.1. Earnings management variables  
!"##$,& in model 1 represents the discretionary accruals – our accruals earnings management proxy. We obtain the 
discretionary accruals by estimating the modified Jones (1991) model for every industry in each country and year: 
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jkkl,m	: accruals, equal to the difference between earnings and operating cash flow. 
∆opql,m:	change in sales.  
rrpl,m: property, plant and equipment.  
jl,ms+: total assets at the beginning of the period. 
The residuals from equation 3 are the discretionary accruals (!"##$,&).  
For real earnings management, we employ the abnormal cash flows as a metric of real earnings management as in prior 
research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; McGuire et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2017). We estimate the following 
equation at the country-industry-year level:  
 
 

















kÄÅl,m: cash flows from operations.  
ÇjÉpÇl,m: sales.  
∆ÇjÉpÇl,m: change in sales.  
jl,ms+: total assets at the beginning of the period. 
 
Our measure for real earnings management ("#KS$,&), which we use in model 2, is the residuals from equation 4 
multiplied by -1 because the lower the cash flow, the greater the earnings management increase via sales.  
3.1.2. Country-level variables  
For Religiosity, we use the 2009 WIN-Gallup International Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism, which measures 
global self-perceptions on beliefs based on interviews with more than 50,000 men and women selected from 57 countries 
across the globe in five continents. For culture, we use the Power Distance and Individualism measures developed by Hofstede.  
To obtain measures of formal institutions, we conduct a two-step analysis using a two-step approach for a sample of 69 
countries. In the first step, we perform Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) on 48 country-level items selected based on their 
face values (i.e. content validity). These items are drawn from the following databases: World Development Indicators, 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, Global Financial Development, Doing Business Report, Economic Freedom of the World 
and Global Competitiveness Report. The EFA results in 29 items4, which are assigned to three distinct components. Each of 
these components has an eigenvalue greater than 1.00, and they jointly explain 81.84% of the total variance in the original 
data set. 
The Bartlett’s test finds that the reduced set of items collectively meets the necessary threshold of sampling adequacy 
with a value of 0.89 (significant at the 0.001 level), and they have factor loadings (i.e. correlation) exceeding the threshold 
value of 0.65, which is necessary for the inclusion in the factor analysis. As Hair et al. (2010) suggest, in a sample of 70, a 
factor loading of 0.65 or greater is considered practically significant. 
We name the first component ‘Investor Protection’ because it captures the level of investor protection provided by a 
given country’s regulatory environment; the second component is named ‘Enforcement Quality’ because it captures the degree 
of effectiveness and efficiency of the country’s institutions and regulatory system; and the third component is named ‘Equity 
Market Development’ because it captures the depth and breadth of the country’s equity capital market. 
In the second step, we perform Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) with AMOS 22 to test the reliability and validity of 
the measuring instruments and reach the most parsimonious model. The final model consists of 22 items5. A review of the fit 
indices (see Appendix C) shows that the overall structural model satisfactorily fits the observed data. The ratio of the chi-
square to the degrees of freedom CMIN/DF6 was 1.43 (below the thresholds of 2-5), indicating a good model fit. The goodness-
of-fit index (GFI=0.86) and the adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI=0.79) were slightly lower than the desired threshold of 
0.90, which suggests a reasonable model fit. Furthermore, the comparative fit index (CFI=0.97) and the normed fit index 
(NFI=0.91) were both above 0.90, which suggests a good fit between the structural model and the data.   
The reliability of each indicator is given by their loadings or the correlations between the indicators and construct on 
which they load (λ). Table D-1 (in Appendix D) shows that all of the loading estimates were sufficiently large (λ> 0.50), 
positive, and statistically significant as required for convergent validity (see Campbell and Fiske, 1959). The table also shows 
 
4 An item can be a single indicant or an index which consists of a certain number of indicants. 
5 A full list of these 22 items, along with their corresponding sources and definitions, is shown in Appendix B. 
6 CMIN/DF was used as an alternative to the chi-square statistic (and its p-value) because it is highly sensitive to sample size (Sharma et al., 
2005).    
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that all of the constructs measured (Investor Protection, Enforcement Quality, and Equity Market Development) were highly 
reliable because their individual Cronbach’s alpha values were greater than the accepted reliability threshold of 0.70 (see Hair 
et al., 2010). The convergent validity is measured by the average variance extracted (AVE), which represents the common 
variance between indicators and their construct. The AVE values for all our constructs are above the commonly recommended 
level of 0.50, thereby satisfying the requirement for convergent validity (see Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Discriminant or 
divergent validity between constructs is established if the square root of AVE for each construct is greater than the squared 
inter-construct correlation estimates (SIC) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Table D-2 (in Appendix D) shows the square root of AVE between constructs and their indicators, correlations among 
constructs, and their squared values. In view of this data, the square roots of the AVEs were greater than their respective inter-
construct correlations, suggesting that the constructs assessed in the model have fully passed the test of discriminant validity, 
despite being positively and significantly correlated with one another, which is in line with previous studies (see Leuz, 2010, 
for example). Appendix E shows the country scores for each of these factors.7 
3.1.3. Firm-level variables  
We use several firm-level variables that have been shown to influence earnings management in previous studies (e.g. 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Doukakis, 2014; Houqe et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2017). We control for firm size (SIZE), the natural 
logarithm of total assets, which could affect the firm’s tendency and ability to manage earnings. We include leverage (LEV) 
to control for capital structure, and we use the total debt-to-equity ratio as a measure of the firm’s leverage. There is substantial 
evidence that firms with binding debt covenants, an indication of higher leverage, are more likely to boost their earnings to 
mitigate covenant violations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Francis and Wang, 2008). Klein (2002) found that discretionary 
accruals are negatively associated with size and positively with leverage.  
We also control for growth (GROWTH), the annual percentage change in sales, as prior research suggests that the 
incentive to boost earnings increases with firms’ growth opportunities (e.g. Barth et al., 1999; Skinner and Sloan, 1999). To 
control for financial performance (Kothari et al., 2005), we use the return on assets (ROA). We include the natural logarithm 
of outstanding shares (SHARES) to control for capital market incentives (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Similar to 
Doukakis (2014), we include ACFO in equation 1 and DACC in equation 2 to control for firms using mixed earnings 
management strategies (i.e. real and accrual-based earnings management). Finally, we include industry and year fixed-effect 
dummy variables to control for heterogeneity across industries and time. 
3.2. Sample and data  
To measure earnings management in the main and additional tests, we extract the financial statement data from Thomson 
One Banker over the period 2005–2010. We exclude all financial and utilities firms and include firms with available data to 
calculate earnings management metrics and the firm-level variables. We require at least eight observations in each two-digit 
GICS grouping per year. The firms in our sample are from 22 countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 or before, which enables 
us to isolate the probable effect of accounting standards and focus on the effect of formal and informal institutions on earnings 
management. Our final sample consists of 15,979 observations across 22 countries, as Table 1 presents, over the period 2007–
2010.8 The UK and Hong Kong have the most observations with 2,592 and 2,184 observations, respectively (about 29.88% 
of the sample). France, Germany, Australia and Singapore provide the next four largest numbers of sample observations with 
1,576, 1,420, 1,307, and 1,264, respectively. Portugal has the lowest number of observations with 88.  
 
7 Due to space constraints, we only report results related to the 22 countries that constitute the sample for this study. The table of results for 
the full 69-country sample can be made available upon request. 
8 Some earnings management proxies used in the analysis require data for at least three consecutive years.  
11 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.3. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for both the firm-level and country-level variables. We winsorize all firm-level 
variables at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions to mitigate the influence of outliers. The mean and median of the 
discretionary accruals (DACC) are -0.0001 and 0.0016, respectively. The mean and median of the abnormal cash flows from 
operations (ACFO) are -0.0003 and 0.0015, respectively. The absolute values of the discretionary accruals and abnormal cash 
flows from operations reveal similar means and medians to those reported by Kim et al. (2017).9 The means of Investor 
Protection and Enforcement Quality are 8.61 and 11.27, respectively. The mean (median) of Equity Market Development is 
167.34 (141.03), with the highest and lowest scores in Hong Kong (510.38) and Bulgaria (38.65) respectively in our country 
sample. The mean (median) of Religiosity is 40.64 (29.50), suggesting that 40.64% of the firm-year observations are from 
less-religious countries. The means of Power Distance and Individualism are 51.40 and 60.65, respectively. Among all these 
factors, Equity Market Development has the highest standard deviation (144.05), indicating that institutional differences across 
the 22 countries included in the sample are mainly explained by differences in the degree of their market development. As a 
result, accounting regulators should step up their efforts in the development of equity markets to narrow the differences and 
catch up. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients and their statistical significance for the variables included in the 
regression models. We find that none of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables are greater than 0.8, 
which indicates that multicollinearity is not a serious, i.e. harmful, problem in our study (see for example, Griffiths et al., 1993; 
Gujarati and Porter, 2009)10. We, however, find that one of the correlations between Individualism and Power Distance, is 
rather high (r = - 0.74). Therefore, the Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) test was carried out to check the problem of 
multicollinearity among the variables. Untabulated results of the VIF statistics show that multicollinearity is not a significant 
problem in this study, as all VIF values are much lower than the cutoff threshold of 10 (see, for example, Hair et al., 2010). In 
model 5 and 6 in Table 4, the mean of VIF values are 2.82 and 2.81 respectively.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. The impact of informal institutions on earnings management 
Table 4 presents the results of the analysis testing the effects of informal institutions (Religiosity and Culture) on accruals 
and real earnings management, after controlling for formal institutions (Investor Protection, Enforcement Quality and Equity 
Market Development). While models 1 and 2 examine the effects of formal institutions on their own, models 3 and 4 investigate 
the effects of informal institutions without taking into consideration the effects of formal institutions. For the models shown 
in Table 4, while the magnitudes of the key coefficients change, their respective signs do not, and their (statistical) significance 
persists except for Enforcement and Quality and Individualism, which indicates the limitations of the formal models and 
informal models when run separately. Models 5 and 6 are therefore more important than models 1 to 4, especially because 
they estimate the effects of informal institutions (religiosity and culture) on abnormal accruals and abnormal cash flows after 
controlling for formal institutions.  
 
9 The mean (media) for absolute discretionary accruals is 0.0641 (0.0661), and the mean (median) for absolute abnormal cash flows is 0.0807 
(0.0906).  
10 Researchers (e.g. Gujarati and Porter, 2009, Hair et al., 2010) suggest multicollinearity is not a significant problem if the correlation is 
below 0.8 or 0.9. According to Griffiths et al. (1993), “a correlation coefficient between two explanatory variables greater than 0.8 or 0.9 
indicates a strong linear association and a potentially harmful collinear relationship.” 
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 [INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The regression results show that the estimated coefficients for all formal and informal institutional variables are 
statistically significant at the conventional levels of significance. In Model 5 where the dependent variable is the (signed) 
discretionary accruals (DACC), the coefficients for all formal institutional variables are negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level of significance (Investor Protection, β=-0.00103, t-statistic=-3.381; Enforcement Quality, β=-0.00377, t-
statistic=-6.592; Equity Market Development, β=-0.0000434, t-statistic=-6.280). Our findings are consistent with prior 
research (e.g. Houqe et al., 2012) and suggest that firms in countries with strong formal institutions (i.e. a higher level of 
investor protection, rigorous enforcement and a higher level of stock market development) tend to engage less in accruals-
based earnings management activities than their counterparts in countries with relatively weak formal institutions. 
In Model 6, where the dependent variable is the abnormal cash flows from operations (ACFO), we find that the 
coefficients for all formal institutions are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance (Investor 
Protection, β=0.00150, t-statistic=4.227; Enforcement Quality, β=0.00498, t-statistic=7.907; Equity Market Development, β= 
0.0000611, t-statistic=7.993). Our findings suggest that firms in countries characterized by strong formal institutions prefer to 
manage their earnings through real earnings management activities. Taken together and consistent with the ‘penalty’ 
hypothesis, the managers of firms domiciled in highly litigious environments consider managing earnings via real earnings 
management, rather than employing accruals manipulation. This is consistent with the findings of a number of studies (e.g. 
Cohen et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2005; Kothari et al., 2016), demonstrating that managing earnings through real activities is 
more difficult for investors to detect and makes it more difficult for them to litigate and sue managers on behalf of their 
corporations. 
Turning to the informal institutions, Religiosity is, on the one hand, significantly and negatively associated with DACC 
in model 5 (β=-0.000317, t-statistic=-9.802) and, on the other hand, strongly positively associated with ACFO in model 6 
(β=0.000430, t-statistic=11.48). In particular, an increase of one standard deviation in Religiosity reduces DACC by 8 
percentage points and raises ACFO by 9 percentage points11. These results indicate that in their responses to external pressure 
from religious social norms, managers in more religious countries appear to engage less in earnings management practices that 
are seen by societal members as less ethical or less socially acceptable (e.g. accruals manipulation) and therefore exhibit a 
greater tendency towards real-activities-based earnings management. These results support the two hypotheses, H1a and H1b. 
Our findings are entirely consistent with those of McGuire et al. (2012), who find that Religiosity is negatively associated with 
abnormal accruals but positively associated with the two measures of real earnings management. Our findings are also broadly 
consistent with Kanagaretnam et al.’s (2015) conclusion that Religiosity is negatively associated with income-increasing 
earnings management through abnormal loan loss provisions. 
The results also show that Power Distance is negatively and significantly associated with DACC (β=-0.000240, t-
statistic=-5.748) but positively associated with ACFO (β=0.000308, t-statistic=6.455). This confirms the association between 
Power Distance and earnings management as stated in H2. In particular, one standard deviation change in Power Distance 
leads to a 5-percentage-point change in DACC and ACFO. The results show that managers of firms in high-power-distance 
countries appear to manage earnings less through discretionary accruals and more through real activities. Our finding is 
consistent with the view that in their responses to social pressures, managers in high-power-distance societies have less 
incentive to engage in ethically unacceptable or illegitimate social behavior (Waldman et al., 2006), such as accruals-based 
earnings management methods, which are perceived as less ethical than real earnings management methods (Bruns and 
Merchant, 1990). 
 
11 Of all the independent variables, ROA has, however, the strongest effect on real and accrual-based earnings management. Precisely, ROA 
appears to be approximately 8 times larger than Religiosity.  
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As shown in models 5 and 6, Individualism is, on the one hand, negatively and marginally significantly related to DACC 
(β=-0.0000703, t-statistic=-1.905) and, on the other hand, positively and marginally significantly related to ACFO 
(β=0.0000782, t-statistic=1.830). Our findings indicate that Individualism seems not to play a significant role (as would be 
expected) in explaining earnings management when formal institutions are ‘simultaneously’ considered (i.e. H3 is not fully 
supported).  
Overall, our results suggest that when considered in combination, formal and informal institutions, except for 
Individualism, are important determinants of managers’ choices of earnings management methods, implying that informal 
institutions determine the quality of earnings at least as strongly as formal institutions do. In other words, a firm’s motivation 
towards earnings management methods is influenced by the formal and informal institutional settings of the country in which 
it operates. Managers tend to choose earnings management strategies that meet both the legal (formal) and social (informal) 
norms of the environments where their firms are headquartered. More essentially, of all the country-level institutions, 
Religiosity has the strongest effect on accruals and real earnings management activities, followed by Power Distance.  
4.2. Additional tests  
4.2.1. Other measures of accruals and real earnings management  
We conduct a number of sensitivity checks; these include using different models to capture accruals earnings management 
and real earnings management. First, we use the modified Jones (1991) model to measure accruals earnings management, as 
in Dechow et al. (1995): 
ACC$,&
Ais]










Then, we use the residuals from the equation above as a measure of earnings management. The results presented in Table 
5 are the same as those we obtained with Jones’s model in terms of the significance and the relationship between abnormal 
accruals and the independent variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
To show whether our results hold using other proxies of accruals earnings management, we use the Dechow-Dichev 
(hereafter DD) (Dechow and Dichev 2002). As Peek et al. (2013) explains, “the DD model predicts accruals better than the 
MJ model in every country under examination, we recommend using the DD model to calculate abnormal accruals in 
international earnings management research.” (p. 567); therefore, we use the DD model as an additional test.  Following 
Francis et al. (2005), we modify the DD model by adapting it with the fundamental variables from the modified Jones model. 
The residuals from the regression in equation 6 are the alternative metric of accruals earnings management:  
ACC$,& = 	 β\ +	β]CFOh,is] + β^CFOh,i + 	βeCFOh,iã] + 	βå∆REVh,i + 	βçPPEh,i + 	ε	   (6) 
Table 6 shows similar results to those we obtained when we used the Jones model, except for the impact of individualism 
which becomes insignificant rather than significant at 10%, as in Table 4.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Furthermore, we use other measures of real earnings management. Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), RM1 is our 
first measure of real earnings management, computed by adding the abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying the latter by -1. We multiply the abnormal discretionary expenses by -1 because the greater the cut 
in these expenses, the higher the earnings. Therefore, the higher RM1 is, the more likely it is for firms to manage earnings 
upward. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings management, which is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and 
abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying both of them by -1. We multiply the abnormal cash flow by -1 because the 
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lower the cash flow, the greater the manipulation of sales. Thus, the higher RM2 is, the greater the real earnings management 
is.  
To measure the abnormal production costs, we employ the following model, as in Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen 
















Abnormal PROD is the actual PROD minus the normal level of PROD calculated using the estimated coefficient. More 
specifically, the residuals from the regression (7) represent the abnormal PROD. Production costs (PROD) are defined as the 
sum of change in inventory and cost of goods sold during the period. 
To measure the abnormal discretionary expenditures, we use the following model, as in Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen 










Abnormal DISX is the actual DISX minus the normal level of DISX calculated using the estimated coefficient. DISX 
discretionary expenses are the difference between operating income and gross income from WorldScope. We run these 
regressions for each combination of two-digit GICS and year in each country. The results in Table 7, in terms of the 
relationships among formal institutions, religiosity and real earnings management when using RM1 or RM2, are similar to our 
initial results when using abnormal cash flows. However, the effect of power distance on the extent of real earnings 
management is only significant at the 10% level.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
4.2.2. Informal institutions and the direction of earnings management  
Our results revealed that higher religiosity and higher power distance were associated with less accruals earnings 
management, which could be not only less income increasing but also more income decreasing. Therefore, it would be useful 
to investigate the association between informal institutions and income increasing/income decreasing via accruals. It must be 
considered, however, that managers engage in real earnings management actions in an attempt to increase earnings (i.e. upward 
earnings management), rather than to decrease earnings, by accelerating sales through increased price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms. It is far from reality that managers may structure economic transactions (e.g. via sales manipulation) to decrease 
earnings. This is consistent with Graham et al.’s (2005, pp. 34-35) survey findings: 
“80% of survey participants report that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance…to 
meet an earnings target. More than half (55.3%) state that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target…” 
Roychowdhury (2006) also reported that managers take real actions to increase earnings and thus avoiding reporting 
losses. This finding is similar to that of Gunny (2005) who concluded that managers reduced both SGA (selling, general and 
administrative) expenses and R&D expenditures to increase earnings. The literature also provides evidence that managers take 
the real actions during the year while accrual earnings management happens after the year end. Zang (2012), for example, 
found that managers adjusted accruals earnings management after the year end based on the extent of real earnings 
management exercised during the year. As such, managers tend to increase earnings via real activities during the year and then 
determine the level of earnings management via accruals after the year end.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Interestingly, our results in Table 8 reveal that higher religiosity, higher power distance and strong formal institutions are 
not only associated with less income increasing, but also with more income decreasing via accruals. Managers are not only 
less inclined to manipulate earnings upward (via accruals) in an attempt to avoid costly violations of social and legal rules but 
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also are more likely to be conservative. Nevertheless, in their responses to capital market pressure and in an attempt to meet 
earnings targets, the managers of firms in contexts with high institutional quality and strong religious/higher social pressure 
prefer real activities over accruals manipulation as a tool to manage earnings upward, because they are more ethical and more 
difficult to detect (García Lara et al., 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Kothari et al., 2016; McGuire et al., 2012).  
5. Conclusion 
This study has examined the impact of informal institutions on both accruals and real earnings management across 
countries that have adopted IFRS, after controlling for the effect of formal institutions. Formal institutions include written 
rules, such as investor protection laws, while informal institutions are the unwritten social norms, such as religiosity, that shape 
behaviors and attitudes. This paper has argued that including both formal and informal institutions in the analysis of the factors 
influencing accounting practices, such as earnings management, is essential and should lead to more conclusive results.  
The findings indicate that managers switch to real earnings management activities due to social factors. That is, in 
countries with high religiosity and high power distance, accruals earnings management is lower but real earnings management 
is higher. This is because managers hold the view that real earnings management is more ethical than accruals earnings 
management, which may explain why managers in religious societies or those under social pressure in higher-power-distance 
countries are more likely to engage in real earnings management than accruals earnings management.  
Notwithstanding its relatively short time period, this work offers valuable insights into the role of local environments in 
accounting practices under harmonized accounting standards. The findings of this investigation complement those of earlier 
studies on earnings management across countries by providing a more comprehensive institutional analysis using formal and 
informal institutions at the same time. In particular, our findings suggest that informal institutions (culture and religiosity) 
determine managers’ earnings management choices at least as strongly as formal institutions do. It would be, therefore, 
misleading to analyze managers’ choices in managing earnings solely from the formal rules side without considering the role 
of informal constraints or vice versa. The study also establishes more-reliable and more-valid quantitative measures of investor 
protection, enforcement quality and equity market development. This enabled us to overcome the multicollinearity problem 
that has prevented previous studies from including them together in one regression. 
The current study has three limitations. First, this study focuses on the influence of institutions on managers’ choices of 
earnings management methods— assuming there are only two methods (accruals vs. real) through which managers can manage 
earnings. In addition to accruals and real earnings management, managers could, however, use other methods to manage 
earnings. For instance, Athanasakou et al. (2009) find evidence that UK firms tend to engage in classification shifting 
mechanism rather than in accruals management in their attempt to meet analyst expectations. Second, as with most studies 
using econometric approaches, our research can also be subject to omitted variable bias. Although the set of variables used 
has been carefully chosen, they are not inclusive of all variables that may be correlated with country-level institutions (e.g., 
firm-level corporate governance). Third, our study covers a relatively short time period, and thus future research is needed to 
examine whether our findings will hold over time, as countries’ institutions will continue to develop and evolve in the future. 
In particular, future research should take steps to determine whether the findings of the present study are representative of all 
IFRS-adopting countries and whether this is of real concern or is a temporary situation, whereby IFRS users will converge and 
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Table 1 Sample distribution by country 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables       
DACC -0.0001 -0.0434 0.0016 0.0447 0.0855 
ACFO -0.0003 -0.0536 0.0015 0.0532 0.1080 
Country-level variables      
Religiosity  40.6437 26.5000 29.5000 70.0000 21.8752 
Power Distance 51.4032 35.0000 50.0000  68.0000 17.6991 
Individualism  60.6532 35.0000 69.0000 80.0000 24.8569 
Investor Protection  8.6095 6.6800 8.2900 11.0400 2.5995 
Enforcement Quality 11.2666 11.1200 11.5000 11.9100 1.0427 
Equity Market Development  167.3395 76.73 141.0300  174.27 144.0483 
Control variables      
ROA 0.0175 0.0002 0.0381  0.0787 0.1371 
Size 2.3253 1.7249 2.2443 2.8732 0.8738 
Leverage  2.4633 0.4264 0.9960 1.9393 7.1594 
Growth  0.1219 -0.0812 0.0662 0.2437 0.3907 
Shares  1.8375 1.1415 1.8700 2.5360  0.9218 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regressions. They are calculated using 15,979 firm-year 




N Country  N 
Australia 1,307 Netherlands 248 
Austria 92 Norway 384 
Belgium 248 Philippines  219 
Bulgaria 232 Poland 481 
Denmark 284 Portugal 88 
Finland 308  Singapore 1,264  
France 1,576 South Africa 460 
Germany 1,420 Spain 264 
Greece 708 Sweden 764 
Hong Kong 2,184 United Kingdom 2,592 
Italy 616 Total  15,979 
Jordan 240   
This table presents the sample distribution by country. 
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Table 3 Pearson correlations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. DACC 1 
     
  
      
2. ACFO 0.3926* 1 
    
  
      
3. Investor Protection  -0.0002 0.0008 1 
   
  
      
4. Enforcement Quality 0.0023 -0.0020 0.4955* 1 
  
  
      
5. Equity Market Development 0.0002 0.0051 0.6829* 0.3765* 1 
 
  
      
6. Religiosity  -0.0029 0.0063 -0.2992* -0.4821* -0.2877* 1   
      
7. Power Distance  -0.0020 0.0108 0.1311* -0.2978* 0.3606* 0.4407* 1 
      
8. Individualism  0.0009 -0.0102 -0.1878* 0.0668* -0.5446* -0.3468* -0.7400* 1 
   
  
 








11. Leverage -0.0187* 0.0378* -0.0792* 0.0421* -0.0779* -0.0813* -0.1271* 0.1200* -0.1375* -0.0869* 1   
 
12. Growth  0.0226* 0.0138 0.0542* 0.0578* 0.0589* -0.0148 0.0126 -0.0148 0.1298* -0.011 0.0094 1 
 
13. Shares  -0.0046 -0.0173* 0.5484* 0.2621* 0.5842* -0.0111 0.2191* -0.3349* 0.1054* 0.3995* -0.0730* 0.0643* 1 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables in our sample. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  



























         
Religiosity     -4.74e-05** 5.35e-05**  -0.000317*** 0.000430*** 
    (-2.044) (2.045)  (-9.802) (11.48) 
Power Distance     -0.000229*** 0.000301***  -0.000240*** 0.000308*** 
    (-5.690) (6.433)  (-5.748) (6.455) 
Individualism     7.23e-05** -0.000120***  -7.03e-05* 7.82e-05* 
    (2.334) (-3.241)  (-1.905) (1.830) 
Investor Protection  -0.000736** 0.00106***     -0.00103*** 0.00150*** 
 (-2.567) (3.098)     (-3.381) (4.227) 
Enforcement Quality  0.000362 -0.000570     -0.00377*** 0.00498*** 
 (0.681) (-0.930)     (-6.592) (7.907) 
Equity Market Development  -3.36e-05*** 4.92e-05***     -4.34e-05*** 6.11e-05*** 
 (-6.791) (8.646)     (-6.280) (7.993) 
ROA 0.413*** -0.534***  0.414*** -0.535***  0.421*** -0.544*** 
 (48.35) (-55.39)  (49.00) (-56.08)  (49.31) (-56.51) 
Size -0.00933*** 0.0122***  -0.00864*** 0.0112***  -0.0120*** 0.0159*** 
 (-12.32) (13.01)  (-12.08) (12.39)  (-14.72) (15.64) 
Leverage  0.000416*** -0.000482***  0.000361*** -0.000409***  0.000315*** -0.000342** 
 (4.008) (-3.574)  (3.450) (-3.028)  (3.002) (-2.517) 
Growth  -0.0128*** 0.0211***  -0.0131*** 0.0215***  -0.0129*** 0.0211*** 
 (-6.700) (9.716)  (-6.887) (9.918)  (-6.784) (9.771) 
Shares 0.00228*** -0.00464***  -0.000515 -0.000565  0.00596*** -0.00965*** 
 (2.646) (-4.529)  (-0.778) (-0.718)  (6.297) (-8.442) 
DACC  0.765***   0.766***   0.770*** 
  (71.51)   (72.03)   (72.56) 
ACFO 0.534***   0.535***   0.539***  
 (62.28)   (62.60)   (62.87)  
Constant 0.0219*** -0.0286***  0.0258*** -0.0316***  0.100*** -0.132*** 
 (3.260) (-3.758)  (4.687) (-4.892)  (11.22) (-13.52) 
Industry f.e. Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Year f.e. Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
N 15,979 15,979  15,979 15,979  15,979 15,979 
Adjusted R" 0.473 0.527  0.475 0.528  0.480 0.534 
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Religiosity     -4.57e-05** 5.22e-05**  -0.000321*** 0.000432*** 
    (-1.969) (2.006)  (-9.926) (11.60) 
Power Distance     -0.000239*** 0.000309***  -0.000254*** 0.000318*** 
    (-5.968) (6.633)  (-6.093) (6.712) 
Individualism     6.84e-05** -0.000116***  -7.83e-05** 8.46e-05** 
    (2.214) (-3.164)  (-2.123) (1.980) 
Investor Protection  -0.000725** 0.00105***     -0.00100*** 0.00147*** 
 (-2.530) (3.081)     (-3.292) (4.173) 
Enforcement Quality  0.000286 -0.000509     -0.00395*** 0.00511*** 
 (0.537) (-0.830)     (-6.888) (8.089) 
Equity Market Development  -3.42e-05*** 4.96e-05***     -4.43e-05*** 6.18e-05*** 
 (-6.936) (8.773)     (-6.416) (8.101) 
ROA 0.421*** -0.540***  0.422*** -0.541***  0.429*** -0.550*** 
 (49.08) (-55.57)  (49.77) (-56.27)  (50.06) (-56.70) 
Size -0.00915*** 0.0121***  -0.00843*** 0.0110***  -0.0119*** 0.0158*** 
 (-12.10) (12.88)  (-11.84) (12.25)  (-14.57) (15.55) 
Leverage  0.000416*** -0.000482***  0.000359*** -0.000409***  0.000313*** -0.000342** 
 (4.000) (-3.569)  (3.429) (-3.016)  (2.986) (-2.511) 
Growth  -0.00547*** 0.0154***  -0.00579*** 0.0158***  -0.00554*** 0.0153*** 
 (-2.911) (7.191)  (-3.090) (7.389)  (-2.965) (7.207) 
Shares 0.00194** -0.00436***  -0.000907 -0.000249  0.00566*** -0.00938*** 
 (2.270) (-4.265)  (-1.377) (-0.316)  (6.002) (-8.236) 
MJ  0.771***   0.772***   0.775*** 
  (72.43)   (72.99)   (73.52) 
ACFO 0.539***   0.540***   0.544***  
 (62.97)   (63.32)   (63.59)  
Constant 0.0198*** -0.0270***  0.0236*** -0.0299***  0.100*** -0.132*** 
 (2.941) (-3.542)  (4.280) (-4.616)  (11.21) (-13.44) 
Industry f.e. Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year f.e. Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 15,979 15,979  15,979 15,979  15,979 15,979 
Adjusted R" 0.484 0.532  0.485 0.533  0.490 0.540 
In this table, we use the modified Jones model (MJ) to capture accruals earnings management.  
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Religiosity    -4.10e-05** 4.78e-05  -0.000222*** 0.000404*** 
    (-2.066) (1.343)  (-8.166) (8.089) 
Power Distance     -0.000167*** 0.000280***  -0.000182*** 0.000286*** 
    (-4.825) (4.775)  (-5.024) (4.642) 
Individualism     4.92e-05* -0.000124***  -4.72e-05 6.26e-05 
    (1.848) (-2.742)  (-1.536) (1.157) 
Investor Protection  -0.000429* 0.000984**     -0.000643** 0.00143*** 
 (-1.720) (2.329)     (-2.449) (3.180) 
Enforcement  0.000217 -0.000559     -0.00281*** 0.00469*** 
 (0.498) (-0.719)     (-5.894) (5.513) 
Market Development  -2.25e-05*** 4.77e-05***     -2.83e-05*** 5.78e-05*** 
 (-5.081) (6.369)     (-4.759) (5.544) 
ROA 0.303*** -0.493***  0.304*** -0.494***  0.309*** -0.503*** 
 (44.30) (-45.08)  (45.02) (-45.65)  (45.10) (-45.81) 
Size -0.00747*** 0.0117***  -0.00714*** 0.0107***  -0.00940*** 0.0152*** 
 (-11.79) (10.54)  (-11.82) (10.18)  (-13.63) (12.75) 
Leverage  0.000275*** -0.000394***  0.000230*** -0.000325**  0.000202** -0.000263* 
 (3.150) (-2.634)  (2.618) (-2.170)  (2.297) (-1.745) 
Growth  -0.00717*** 0.0210***  -0.00740*** 0.0214***  -0.00722*** 0.0210*** 
 (-4.455) (8.076)  (-4.630) (8.250)  (-4.526) (8.117) 
Shares 0.000829 -0.00485***  -0.000845 -0.00101  0.00345*** -0.00961*** 
 (1.120) (-3.851)  (-1.470) (-1.040)  (4.205) (-6.940) 
DD  0.527***   0.530***   0.537*** 
  (29.12)   (29.42)   (29.75) 
ACFO 0.183***   0.184***   0.187***  
 (28.16)   (28.44)   (28.73)  
Constant 0.0158*** -0.0265***  0.0195*** -0.0285***  0.0724*** -0.123*** 
 (2.906) (-2.739)  (4.111) (-3.674)  (9.782) (-9.398) 
Industry f.e. Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Year f.e. Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
N 15,979 15,979  15,979 15,979  15,979 15,979 
Adjusted R" 0.301 0.277  0.303 0.2784  0.307 0.284 
In this table, we use the DD model to capture accruals earnings management.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
See Appendix A for variables’ definitions. 
























      
Religiosity  -0.000168*** -0.000218***  0.000820*** 0.000655*** 
 (-3.835) (-5.322)  (4.599) (6.495) 
Power Distance  -0.000129** -0.000143***  0.000131 0.000227* 
 (-2.357) (-2.762)  (0.555) (1.734) 
Individualism  -5.37e-05 -6.41e-05  0.000228 0.000162 
 (-1.116) (-1.414)  (1.198) (1.524) 
Investor Protection  -0.000519 -0.000787**  0.00518*** 0.00336*** 
 (-1.288) (-2.074)  (3.008) (3.563) 
Enforcement Quality -0.00204*** -0.00252***  0.00718** 0.00649*** 
 (-2.593) (-3.419)  (2.270) (3.683) 
Equity Market Development  -2.16e-05** -3.08e-05***  0.000145*** 0.000112*** 
 (-2.246) (-3.462)  (4.279) (5.908) 
ROA 0.229*** 0.268***  -0.469*** -0.559*** 
 (31.78) (36.75)  (-15.07) (-30.88) 
Size -0.00676*** -0.00860***  0.0324*** 0.0250*** 
 (-6.870) (-9.186)  (7.359) (10.34) 
Leverage  0.000219* 0.000207*  1.91e-05 -8.63e-05 
 (1.925) (1.885)  (0.0399) (-0.318) 
Growth  -0.00153 0.00109  -0.0359*** -0.0248*** 
 (-0.653) (0.496)  (-4.393) (-5.211) 
Shares 0.00231* 0.00428***  -0.0359*** -0.0231*** 
 (1.948) (3.803)  (-7.329) (-8.436) 
DACC    0.563*** 0.908*** 
    (13.41) (38.77) 
RM1 0.0284***     
 (13.47)     
RM2  0.136***    
  (35.16)    
Constant 0.0538*** 0.0647***  -0.178*** -0.157*** 
 (4.413) (5.712)  (-4.074) (-6.331) 
Industry f.e. Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year f.e. Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 15,979 15,979  15,979 15,979 
Adjusted R" 0.125 0.221  0.036 0.171 
RM1 is computed by adding the abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying the latter by -1. RM2 
is the second measure of real earnings management, which is the aggregation of both the abnormal cash flows and the abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying them by -1. 
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
See Appendix A for all other variable definitions. 
All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Variables DACC (Jones)  MJ 
Income increasing  
(1) 
Income decreasing  
(2) 
 Income increasing  
(3) 
 
Income decreasing  
(4) 
      
Religiosity  -0.000263*** 0.000195***  -0.000236*** 0.000182*** 
 (-7.599) (5.446)  (-6.726) (5.161) 
Power Distance  -9.43e-05** 0.000204***  -9.99e-05** 0.000193*** 
 (-2.176) (4.170)  (-2.286) (3.985) 
Individualism  -0.000103*** 7.92e-05*  -9.97e-05** 5.67e-05 
 (-2.633) (1.946)  (-2.529) (1.403) 
Investor Protection  -0.000400 0.000943***  -0.000779** 0.000930*** 
 (-1.206) (2.839)  (-2.321) (2.827) 
Enforcement Quality  -0.00192*** 0.00267***  -0.00182*** 0.00255*** 
 (-3.031) (4.229)  (-2.831) (4.060) 
Equity Market Development -4.15e-05*** 1.56e-05**  -3.70e-05*** 1.31e-05* 
 (-5.308) (2.093)  (-4.683) (1.786) 
ROA 0.227*** -0.290***  0.237*** -0.295*** 
 (18.37) (-34.67)  (18.50) (-35.20) 
Size -0.0168*** -0.00115  -0.0171*** -0.00160* 
 (-19.40) (-1.322)  (-19.77) (-1.856) 
Leverage  0.000242*** -0.000238**  0.000188** -0.000227** 
 (2.640) (-2.208)  (1.970) (-2.088) 
Growth  0.00407** 0.0201***  0.00771*** 0.0168*** 
 (2.172) (10.33)  (4.126) (8.896) 
Shares 0.00848*** 0.000478  0.00844*** 0.00110 
 (8.658) (0.471)  (8.590) (1.093) 
ACFO 0.324*** -0.325***  0.329*** -0.331*** 
 (28.22) (-30.69)  (28.28) (-31.40) 
Constant 0.133*** 1.62e-05  0.132*** 0.00692 
 (13.73) (0.00159)  (13.50) (0.684) 
Industry f.e. Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Year f.e. Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
N 8,175 7,804  8,148 7,831 
Adjusted R"  0.315 0.400  0.323 0.411 
In column 1 and column 3, the dependent variable is the positive value of the abnormal accruals. In column 2 and column 4, the dependent 
variable is the absolute value of the negative abnormal accruals.  
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
See Appendix A for all other variable definitions. 
All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Appendix A: Variable definitions  
Variable  
 
Source  Definition  
Dependent variables   
DACC Equation 3 Value of the discretionary accruals estimated using the Jones (1991) 
model.  
ACFO Equation 4 Value of the abnormal cash flow from operations multiplied by -1. 
Country-level variables   
Religiosity  Gallup Religiosity 
Index 2009 
“Is religion an important part of your daily life?” 
Power Distance The Hofstede Centre 
(geert-hofstede.com) 
Hofstede’s power distance scores. 
Individualism  The Hofstede Centre 
(geert-hofstede.com) 
Hofstede’s individualism scores. 
Investor Protection  See Appendix B/C/D The (predicted) factor scores computed as linear functions of the 
observed-variable scores: (1) Revised Anti-Director Rights Index; (2) 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index; (3) Strength of Investor Protection Index; and 
(4) Business Extent of Disclosure Index. 
Enforcement Quality  See Appendix B/C/D The (predicted) factor scores computed as linear functions of the 
observed-variable scores: (1) Regulatory Quality Index; (2) corporate 
ethics; (3) strength of auditing and reporting standards; (4) efficacy of 
corporate boards; (5) protection of minority shareholders; and (6) 
regulation of securities exchanges.  
 
Equity Market Development  See Appendix B/C/D The (predicted) factor scores computed as linear functions of the 
observed-variable scores: (1) the ratio of the number of domestic firms 
listed in a given country to its population; (2) market capitalization of 
listed companies (% of GDP); and (3) stock market total value traded to 
GDP. 
Firm-level variables   
ROA Thomson One Banker Net income divided by total assets. 
Size  Thomson One Banker  The natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. 
Leverage  Thomson One Banker The end-of-year total liabilities divided by the end-of-year equity book 
value for firm i in year t. 
Growth  Thomson One Banker The sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-
1. 







Appendix B: Composite variables of the latent variables 
Factor No. of 
items 
Dimensions Sub-dimensions Sources 
Equity Market 
Development 
3 (1) The national logarithm of the average ratio of the number of 
domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (in 
millions) for the period 2006–2010. 
 World Bank / Global 
Financial Development 
(GFD) 
(2) The average ratio of the total market capitalization to the 
country’s GDP for the period 2006–2010. 
(3) The average ratio of the total value of shares traded to the 
country’s GDP for the period 2006–2010. 
Enforcement Quality 11 (1) Regulatory Quality Index and government investment: the 
simple average of (1) judicial independence (2); impartial courts; 
(3) protection of property rights; (4) military interference in rule 
of law and politics; (5) integrity of the legal system; (6) legal 
enforcement of contracts; (7) extra payments/bribes/favoritism; 
and (8) government enterprises and investment. 
Judicial independence. “Is the judiciary in your 
country independent from political influences of 
members of government, citizens, or firms? No – 
heavily influenced (= 1) or Yes – entirely 
independent (= 7).” All variables from the Global 
Competitiveness Report were converted from the 
original 1–7 scale to a 0–10 scale using this formula: 
EFWi = ((GCRi− 1) ÷ 6) × 10.  
World Economic Forum 
/ Global 
Competitiveness Report 
Impartial courts. “The legal framework in your 
country for private businesses to settle disputes and 
challenge the legality of government actions and/or 
regulations is inefficient and subject to manipulation 
(= 1) or is efficient and follows a clear, neutral 
process (= 7).” Note the ‘rule of law’ ratings from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) have been used to fill in country omissions in 
the primary data source since 1995.  
World Economic Forum 
Protection of property rights. This component is from 
the Global Competitiveness Report question: 
“Property rights, including over financial assets, are 
poorly defined and not protected by law (= 1) or are 
clearly defined and well protected by law (= 7).” 
Note this replaces a previous Global Competitiveness 
World Economic Forum 
29 
 
Report question on the protection of intellectual 
property.  
Military interference in rule of law and politics. This 
component is based on the International Country Risk 
Guide: “A measure of the military’s involvement in 
politics. A system of military government will almost 
certainly diminish effective governmental 
functioning, become corrupt, and create an uneasy 
environment for foreign businesses.” Note the 
‘political stability and absence of violence’ ratings 
from the World Bank’s WGI have been used to fill in 
country omissions in the primary data source since 
1995.  
World Economic Forum 
Integrity of the legal system. This component is based 
on the International Country Risk Guide: “Two 
measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-
component equals half of the total. The ‘law’ sub-
component assesses the strength and impartiality of 
the legal system, and the ‘order’ sub-component 
assesses popular observance of the law.”  
World Economic Forum 
Legal enforcement of contracts. This component is 
based on the World Bank’s Doing Business estimates 
for the time and money required to collect a debt. 
Ratings of 0–10 were constructed for (1) the time cost 
(measured in the number of calendar days required 
from the moment the lawsuit is filed until payment); 
and (2) the monetary cost of the case (measured as a 
percentage of the debt).  
World Economic Forum 
Extra payments / bribes / favoritism. This sub-
component is based on the Global Competitiveness 
Report questions: “In your industry, how commonly 
would you estimate that firms make undocumented 
extra payments or bribes connected with the 
following: A – Import and export permits; B – 
Connection to public utilities (e.g., telephone or 
electricity); C – Annual tax payments; D – Awarding 
of public contracts (investment projects); E – Getting 
World Economic Forum 
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favorable judicial decisions. Common (= 1), Never 
occur (= 7)”; “Do illegal payments aimed at 
influencing government policies, laws or regulations 
have an impact on companies in your country? 1 = 
Yes, significant negative impact, 7 = No, no impact at 
all”; and “To what extent do government officials in 
your country show favoritism to well-connected firms 
and individuals when deciding upon policies and 
contracts? 1 = Always show favoritism, 7 = Never 
show favoritism.”  
Government enterprises and investment. Data on 
government investment as a share of total investment 
were used to construct the 0–10 ratings. Countries 
with more government enterprises and government 
investment received lower ratings. When the 
government investment share was generally less than 
15% of the total investment, countries were given a 
rating of 10.  
World Economic Forum 
(2) Strength of auditing and reporting standards: “In your 
country, how would you assess financial auditing and reporting 
standards regarding company financial performance?” [1 = 
extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong.] 
 Global Competitiveness 
Report 
(3) Efficacy of corporate boards: “How would you characterize 
corporate governance by investors and boards of directors in your 
country?” [1 = management has little accountability to investors 
and boards; 7 = investors and boards exert strong supervision of 
management decisions.] 
 Global Competitiveness 
Report 
(4) Protection of minority rights. “In your country, to what extent 
are the interests of minority shareholders protected by the legal 
system?” [1 = not protected at all; 7 = fully protected.] 
 Global Competitiveness 
Report 
(5) Effectiveness of securities regulation: “How would you assess 
the regulation and supervision of securities exchanges in your 
country?” [1 = ineffective; 7 = effective.] 




Investor Protection 7 (1) Revised Anti-Director Rights Index: an aggregate measure of 
the legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders.  
 Djankov et al. (2008) 
(2) Anti-Self-Dealing Index (0-1): equals the average of ex-ante 
and ex-post private control over self-dealing transactions.  
(1) Ex-ante private control of self-dealing: identifies 
the strength of private enforcement of provisions 
against self-dealing by insiders, focusing on ex-ante 
control (e.g. requiring approval by disinterested 
shareholders and ex-ante disclosures). 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
(2) Ex-post private control of self-dealing: identifies 
the strength of private enforcement of provisions 
against self-dealing by insiders, focusing on ex-post 
control (e.g. periodic filing requirements and ease of 
proving wrongdoing). 
(3) Strength of Investor Protection Index (0–10): the average of: 
(1) the Extent of Disclosure Index; (2) the Extent of Director 
Liability Index; and (3) the Ease of Shareholder Suits Index. 
(1) Extent of Disclosure Index: identifies the approval 
and transparency of related-party transactions. 
Doing Business 
Indicators / World Bank 
Group 
(2) Extent of Director Liability Index: identifies the 
liability of company directors for self-dealing 
(3) Ease of Shareholder Suits Index: identifies 
shareholders’ ability to obtain corporate documents 
before and during litigation. 
(4) Business Extent of Disclosure Index: identifies the extent to 
which investors are protected through disclosure of ownership 
and financial information. The index ranges 0–10, with higher 
values indicating more disclosure. 










Appendix C: Measurement of formal institutions  
Appendix D: Reliability, convergent validity, discriminant validity 
Table D-1 Individual loadings (λ), composite reliability (CR), average variance extracted (AVE) 
Construct Indicators  λ CR AVE 
Equity Market Development  Stock market total value traded 0.82*** 0.86 0.69 
 Stock market capitalization 0.98***   
 Number of listed companies 0.65***   
Enforcement Quality Regulatory quality index 0.82*** 0.96 0.83 
 Strength of auditing and reporting standards 0.98***   
 Efficacy of corporate boards 0.88***   
 Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 0.94***   
 Effectiveness of securities regulations 0.91***   
Investor Protection Business extent of disclosure index 0.83*** 0.88 0.66 
 Strength of investor protection index 0.88***   
 Anti-self-dealing index 0.90***   
 Revised Anti-Director index 0.62***   
 
 
Table D-2 Correlations and inter-construct correlations (SIC) 
Construct 1 2 3 
1. Equity Market Development  0.83   
    
2. Enforcement Quality 0.54* 0.91  
 (0.29)   
3.Investor Protection 0.43* 0.50* 0.81 
 (0.18) (0.25)  
Note: Diagonal elements in bold font are the square roots of 
AVEs. Off-diagonal elements are correlations and SIC. For 
discriminant validity, diagonal elements should be greater than 


















Australia 8.7 141.03 11.91 36 90 32 
Austria 5.37 46.11 11.43 11 55 55 
Belgium 8.22 76.73 11.22 65 75 33 
Bulgaria 8.29 38.65 8.17 70 30 33.5 
Denmark 7.63 83.35 11.78 18 74 18 
Finland 7.08 100.71 12.18 33 63 28 
France 7.27 95.69 11.12 68 71 29.5 
Germany 5.82 60.67 11.46 35 67 40.5 
Greece 3.6 56.89 9.52 60 35 71.5 
Hong Kong 11.87 510.38 11.75 68 25 23 
Italy 6.68 42.95 8.28 50 76 71.5 
Jordan 4.64 174.27 10.39 70 30 96.5 
Netherlands 4.71 100.78 11.54 38 80 33 
Norway 7.56 81.09 12.04 31 69 20.5 
Philippines  4.64 62.56 9.42 94 32 95.5 
Poland 6.26 46.02 9.49 68 60 74.5 
Portugal 6.82 53.44 10.07 63 27 71.5 
Singapore 11.93 188.57 12.11 74 20 70 
South Africa 10.27 232.95 12.24 49 65 84.5 
Spain 6.35 110.52 9.74 57 51 49.5 
Sweden 6.78 126.88 12.47 31 71 16.5 
United Kingdom 11.04 144.36 11.5 35 89 26.5 
This table presents country-level variables.  
 
